At his March 11 Senate confirmation hearing, Navy Vice Adm. Michael Rogers, chosen by President Obama to be the next director of the National Security Agency, declines to characterize NSA leaker Edward Snowden as a traitor.
2014 is finally the "The Year of Security." When the year stars fresh on the heels of the announcement that Target has suffered a data breach that impacts tens of millions of consumer payment cards ... that gets attention. And when that's followed up quickly with a second major breach, this one of luxury retailer...
The leader of a crime ring that used stolen Social Security numbers to commit $4 million worth of bank, credit card and tax fraud has been sentenced to 12 years in prison for his role.
As the U.S. federal government tightens procedures to prevent Edward Snowden-type insider leaks, agency leaders are discovering that implementing well-thought-out plans isn't easy.
How can organizations mitigate the risks posed by the unintentional insider threat? The strategy requires a combination of technical and non-technical solutions, says researcher Randy Trzeciak.
An independent presidential panel makes recommendations to limit the National Security Agency's surveillance methods, including curtailing the way the government systematically collects and stores metadata from Americans' phone calls.
A federal district court judge's ruling that a National Security Agency program collecting metadata from telephone calls could be unconstitutional suggests that the law hasn't kept pace with changing technology.
NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander says the agency has taken 41 actions to prevent leaks by insiders in the wake of disclosures of classified documents about the agency's surveillance programs by former agency contractor Edward Snowden.
You can be outraged that the NSA collects Internet communications records of U.S. citizens. But don't be surprised, says sociologist William Staples. This is just one example of our "culture of surveillance."
In mitigating insider threats, technology should be used in conjunction with information sharing and risk-prevention business practices, says Jason Clark, a researcher at Carnegie Mellon University.
For years, researchers have studied malicious insider threats. But how can organizations protect themselves from insiders who make a mistake or are taken advantage of in a way that puts the organization at risk?
The average insider scheme lasts 32 months before it's detected, says threat researcher Jason Clark, who suggests using a combination of the right technologies and the right processes is the key to improving detection.
Randy Trzeciak and his CERT Insider Threat Center colleagues are working to broaden the definition of the insider threat to incorporate not just the risk to information and IT but to facilities and people, too.
To address the insider threat, Jeremy Walczak of Independent Health is using a privileged identity management system. Walczak and other experts offer detailed insights on mitigating emerging threats.
The author of the forthcoming book "Secrets and Leaks" explains why the acts of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden don't carry the same weight as those of Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
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